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Legal News [March 2025]: The Supreme Court addresses the validity of withdrawal from non-‎compete clauses

Last month, the Supreme Court addressed several important issues in its rulings, ranging from equal ‎treatment of judges to the statute of limitations on easements, and the abuse of rights in the ‎withdrawal from non-compete clauses. It confirmed that the principle of equal treatment applies to ‎judges as well, but the reassignment of a judge to another section to balance workload is not ‎discrimination. It also opened the question of whether preparatory works can be considered the ‎execution of an easement and sent the decisions of lower courts back for reassessment. ‎Furthermore, it criticized the procedure of a company that withdrew from a non-compete clause at ‎the last moment without considering whether this circumvented the obligation to pay compensation. ‎In the last of the monitored rulings, it confirmed that if an owner abandons a property because they ‎have no way to use it, this is not an abuse of rights—the responsibility for its administration then lies ‎with the state.‎

  • In its decision ref. no. 21 Cdo 3084/2024, the Supreme Court addressed whether the ‎principle of equal treatment for employees, which employers are obligated to ensure under § ‎‎16 par. 1 of the Labour Code, also applies to judges. The plaintiff, a judge at the Regional ‎Court in Ústí nad Labem, disagreed with her reassignment to the administrative section and ‎saw the defendant’s (Regional Court Ústí nad Labem) action as unequal treatment. The ‎Supreme Court concluded that the principle of equal treatment under § 16 par. 1 of the ‎Labour Code applies to the working conditions of judges. Furthermore, it upheld the decision ‎of the appellate court, which found that the defendant’s action, reassigning the plaintiff from ‎the civil section to the administrative judiciary section where she was to handle cases ‎corresponding to this specialization, did not violate the principle of equal treatment. This ‎change aimed at reducing or eliminating the workload disparity between civil judges and ‎administrative judges, who were burdened with more cases than civil judges, thereby seeking ‎to equalize the working conditions of judges in both sections. Given these circumstances, the ‎reassignment of the plaintiff cannot be considered an unjust disadvantage compared to ‎other civil judges regarding the opportunity to achieve functional or other advancement, ‎irrespective of the fact that this opportunity is also available in the administrative judiciary ‎section. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.‎
  • In its decision ref. no. 22 Cdo 1476/2024, the Supreme Court dealt with the characterization ‎of the execution of an easement—a utility easement—by activities that are in the nature of ‎preparatory works. The District Court in Mladá Boleslav ruled that the easement for the ‎placement of communication and utilities on the plaintiff’s land was statute-barred because ‎it had not been used for ten years. The appellate court in Prague confirmed the ruling and ‎emphasized that preparatory works (e.g., signing a memorandum with the municipality or ‎approving a study by the city council) are not actual execution of the easement. The courts ‎consistently ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to claim the statute of limitations. The ‎Supreme Court concluded that categorically excluding preparatory works as the execution of ‎the easement is incorrect and could cause additional unintended consequences. It would ‎be paradoxical if the holder of the easement, who engages in preparatory works on the ‎servient land, was protected in the execution of such rights against the servient land owner ‎but it did not count as the substantial execution of the easement preventing the statute of ‎limitations. Practical situations may arise where the execution of preparatory works does not ‎correspond to the nature of the easement or its content. If the execution of activities has no ‎substantive, temporal, or locational connection with the easement, the servient property ‎owner may resist such actions. Evaluating these cases often involves considering individual ‎circumstances of the specific case according to the type of easement, and the courts’ ‎conclusions must reflect these peculiarities. Because the lower courts excluded preparatory ‎works as potential execution of the substantial content of the easement without further ‎evaluation, the Supreme Court returned the case to the first-instance court.‎
  • In its decision ref. no. 27 Cdo 1236/2024, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of ‎withdrawing from a non-compete clause agreed between a joint-stock company and a ‎member of its elected body. The plaintiff, former chairman of the board of directors of the ‎defendant, sought payment for non-compete clause compensation, but the courts at both ‎levels dismissed the claim, reasoning that withdrawal from the clause was valid and ‎effective. The appellate court confirmed that the defendant had the right to withdraw from ‎the non-compete clause even on the last day of the plaintiff’s term and found its action ‎consistent with good morals. The Supreme Court criticized the lower courts’ decisions for ‎merely stating that the withdrawal was agreed upon and the defendant executed it within the ‎stipulated period. This finding is not significant in considering whether the defendant abused ‎its right to withdraw from the non-compete clause. The existence of the right is a prerequisite ‎for its abuse. In other words, the fact that the defendant could withdraw from the clause even ‎on the last day of the plaintiff’s term does not indicate whether it abused the right to ‎withdraw. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court did not assess whether the ‎defendant’s action was an apparent abuse aimed at avoiding payment of non-compete ‎compensation, which ultimately harmed the plaintiff by significantly reducing his chances of ‎finding a new position in the banking sector. The Supreme Court, therefore, overturned the ‎decision and returned the case to the first-instance court.‎
  • In its decision ref. no. 22 Cdo 3489/2024, the Supreme Court assessed whether the ‎abandonment of a property by the defendant constituted an abuse of rights. The plaintiff ‎argued that the abandonment of the property, which subsequently fell to the state, aimed to ‎bypass § 12 par. 2 of Act No. 219/2000 Coll., on gratuitous transfer of property to the state, ‎requiring the consent of the Ministry of Finance. The defendant argued that they had no ‎adequate use for the property and so abandoned it. The appellate court confirmed that ‎abandoning property does not constitute an abuse of rights unless accompanied by specific ‎and extraordinary circumstances. The Supreme Court stated that the future development ‎and value of the property are unpredictable and the fact that the abandonment may lead to ‎state rights and obligations is insufficient to claim abuse of rights. The court supported the ‎view that the owner has the right to manage their property, including its abandonment if it has ‎no adequate use. The court found that abandonment cannot be considered abuse unless ‎accompanied by exceptional circumstances indicating harmful or unfair action. Possible ‎difficulties associated with the abandoned property, such as technical or legal defects, were ‎not confirmed by the court as grounds for dismissal on the basis of abuse of rights. The ‎Supreme Court concluded that abandonment of property, especially of religious nature, is ‎not automatically abuse if the owner has no meaningful use for it. The state’s obligation to ‎manage such property remains and associated difficulties do not justify an abuse of rights ‎claim.‎
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