Law Legal News [March 2024]: Post-traumatic stress disorder as a work injury?
Post-traumatic stress disorder as a work injury, payment of a debt by a third party without the debtor’s consent, designation of a regular place of work in the absence of an agreement thereon, or delay in payment of the balance of the price of work in a situation where the amount is withheld due to defective supply by the contractor. These and other interesting topics, which have been addressed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in recent weeks, are discussed in the current issue of our Legal News.
- The question whether a third party that is not obliged to settle a debt may pay the creditor without the debtor’s consent in the context of the legislative regulation effective as of 1 January 2014 was addressed by the Supreme Court in its judgement No. 28 Cdo 1214/2023. The Civil Code does not expressly address this issue and therefore does not prohibit such a procedure. Opinions in the expert literature are divided. However, the Supreme Court is inclined to the view that the debtor’s consent to the performance of their debt by a third party is not necessary either for the performance of the debtor’s obligation or for the establishment of unjust enrichment. It is therefore irrelevant whether or not the debtor consented to the described conduct of the third party. The only way to prevent such a course of action is to negotiate with the creditor a prohibition on performance by the third party.
- The Supreme Court, in its judgement No. 21 Cdo 2608/2023, addressed the as yet unresolved issue of the criteria for determining the location of an employee’s regular workplace in cases where this location is not agreed upon between the employer and the employee or is agreed upon in violation of the provisions of Section 34a of the Labour Code. To address this issue, it is important that the purpose of the regulation of the institute of a regular workplace is both to apply the fundamental principle of employment relations, namely the principle of special legal protection of the employee’s position, and to express the principle that dependent work must be performed at the employer’s expense. If the place of the regular place of work has been specified in the employment contract as an optional element of its content, the place so agreed may be changed only by amending the content of the employment contract. The Supreme Court further reasoned from the provisions of Section 34a of the Labour Code that the determination of the location of the regular workplace in accordance with the rules set out therein has the same effect as if the place of the regular workplace had been agreed in the employment contract (even if this is not expressly the case). The consequence is that even in such a case an amendment of the content of the employment contract is necessary for the change. A unilateral instruction by the employer to start work at a new location, different from the employee’s previous regular workplace is not sufficient.
- In another judgement from the field of labour law, Case No. 21 Cdo 3408/2022, the Supreme Court sought an answer to another issue that has not yet been resolved in case law, i.e. whether and under what conditions can post-traumatic stress disorder be considered a health impairment caused by a work-related injury. The Supreme Court concluded that post-traumatic stress disorder can qualify as a work-related injury under certain circumstances. The key issue is whether it develops as a result of an extremely intense stressful experience triggered by an event that took place in the workplace to which the injured employee was exposed as a direct participant or observer in the course of or in direct connection with the performance of his or her work tasks. At the same time, the relevant incident must significantly deviate from the normal, day-to-day conditions of the employee’s work. If this is not the case, as in the present case, where the person experienced merely incidental (secondary) manifestations of such an event (noise, stirred up dust, fleeing crowds, etc.), it is not a work-related injury.
- In its judgement No. 25 Cdo 2797/2023, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of the creation of a claim for default interest in the case of insurance benefits for compensation for impairment of social status, which had not been resolved in the practice of the Court of Appeal. In accordance with the ruling of the Constitutional Court (Case No. II ÚS 2149/17), the Supreme Court concluded that a claim for compensation for non-property damage in monetary terms must be considered a claim of a property nature, i.e. a monetary debt, albeit arising from individual rights. The same applies to the insurance company’s claim for compensation for the impairment of social status. If the debtor (the insurance company) is in default in the payment of this debt, the injured party is also entitled to default interest. Pursuant to Section 1970 of the Civil Code, all monetary debts are entitled to default interest, irrespective of the legal basis from which they arose.
- The issue of the client’s delay in settling the additional payment of the price of the work in the situation of withholding a certain amount due to defective performance by the contractor was dealt with by the Supreme Court for the first time in its decision-making practice in its judgment No. 33 Cdo 2909/2023. The Court reasoned that even if no specific right on the basis of defective performance was exercised by the client after the defect had been notified, the client would be entitled to withhold part of the price provided that the defect had not been removed (whereby removal is possible until the right to a discount or withdrawal from the contract is exercised). Subsequent application of the discount will result in a reduction of the purchase price and in the event of withdrawal from the contract the obligation of the purchaser (customer) to pay the purchase price will cease. It follows from the wording of Section 2108 of the Civil Code, in particular from the formulation “reasonably corresponds to the estimate”, that even if the amount of the “reasonable discount” on the price of the work turns out to be different from the amount withheld by the client, the withholding of such an amount (i.e. even to the extent of the given difference) cannot be considered unjustified if its amount “reasonably corresponds to the estimate” of the discount.
